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HARBORING PIRATES ON THE NEW YORK STOCK 






On April 17, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued an opin-
ion dismissing the complaint in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,1 
thereby disappointing the plaintiffs and many human rights advocates 
and (presumably) eliciting sighs of relief from current and potential for-
eign alien corporate defendants. The Court had been faced with a Second 
Circuit decision that posed the question of whether corporations could be 
sued for violations of the law of nations.
2
 The Court chose instead to 
answer the question of whether the statutory basis for the U.S. courts’ 
jurisdiction—the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—provides jurisdiction for 
cases against foreign defendants where the alleged violations occurred in 
a country other than the United States, and held that it does not, applying 
a canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.
3
   
A whirlwind of online commentary ensued and many law review 
pages will be filled in the years to come by advocates and scholars trying 
to discern what exactly the majority and concurring opinions indicate 
about how the Court will treat future ATS cases. Does the Court’s avoid-
ance of the initial question presented indicate tacit approval of corporate 
liability for such violations? How intertwined with the U.S. does the de-
fendant, the alleged violations, or both, need to be to overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality? The opinions in Kiobel give particu-
larly little direction as to this latter question, because a clear point of 
agreement among all the Justices is that—in this case—the defendants 
and their alleged violations did not meet whatever standard for connec-
tion to the U.S. might be required because “mere corporate presence” 
does not suffice. This article suggests that this unanimous conclusion, 
presented without discussion, merited fuller consideration.     
  
 † Katherine L. Caldwell is a Lawyering Process Professor at the University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law. 
1.133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 3. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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KIOBEL IN BRIEF 
Kiobel involved claims filed in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in 2002 against Dutch, British, and Nigerian corpo-
rations. The statutory basis for U.S. courts’ jurisdiction in the suit—the 
ATS—provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
4
 The plaintiffs, Nigerian 
legal resident aliens granted asylum in the U.S., had previously lived in 
Ogoniland in the Niger Delta in the early 1990s, where a Nigeria-
incorporated joint subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
(Netherlands) and Shell Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. (Eng-
land) was engaged in oil exploration and production. The complaint al-
leges that between 1992 and 1995 these corporations violently sup-
pressed popular protest regarding the environmental impact of these oil-
related activities by aiding and abetting Nigerian government forces in 
the commission of innumerable atrocities in Ogoni villages, including: 
(1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and 
cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the 
rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) 
property destruction. Defendant corporations allegedly provided the gov-
ernment forces committing these acts with compensation, food, transpor-
tation, and access to property from which to launch their attacks.
5
   
On September 29, 2006, the District Court issued an order granting 
defendants’ motion to dismiss a number of the claims on the grounds that 
the facts alleged did not give rise to violations of the law of nations, but 
denied the motion in regards to the allegations of crimes against humani-
ty, torture, and arbitrary detention, and certified the order for interlocuto-
ry appeal.
6
 On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit dismissed the 
complaint in its entirety on the grounds that law of nations—also referred 
to as customary international law—does not recognize corporate liabil-
ity.
7
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on 
the corporate liability question, but then directed the parties to file sup-
plemental briefs and reargue the case focusing on the question the Court 
eventually addressed: “Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS] 
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
  
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
 5. Given the scope of this article, it by necessity gives short shrift to the events in Nigeria 
underlying the suit and the victims’ stories, some of which are available on the websites of interna-
tional human rights organizations and provide a sense of the human cost of the events at issue. See 
e.g., Kiobel v. Shell: Light Dims on Human Rights Cases in U.S., THE CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=510 (last visited May 23, 2013). 
 6. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 7. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 122. 
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined 
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, reasons that, although 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is usually applied to Congres-
sional acts regulating conduct and not to jurisdictional statutes like the 
ATS, “[t]he principles underlying the presumption against extraterritori-
ality . . . constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.”
9
 The 
defendants’ ties to the U.S. were insufficient to “displace” the presump-
tion, according to the majority, because “[c]orporations are often present 
in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.”
10
 Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, as did 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas.  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
filed an opinion, concurring in the judgment only, arguing that the pre-
sumption of extraterritoriality should not be applied to a statute so clearly 
addressing “foreign matters,” and that jurisdiction should be found under 
the ATS when: 
(1) [T]he alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an 
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that 
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from be-
coming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a 
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
11
  
Breyer describes the ATS as legislation aimed at “pirates,” asks 
“[w]ho are today’s pirates?” and answers that among them are surely 
torturers and perpetrators of genocide, concluding that “today, like the 
pirates of old, they are ‘fair game’ where they are found.”
12
  
However, Breyer agrees with the majority that, in this case, the al-
leged pirates were not “found” in the U.S. in such a way that would give 
U.S. courts jurisdiction: “[T]he parties and relevant conduct lack suffi-
cient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction.”
13
 Why 
do the defendants lack sufficient ties to the U.S. to trigger jurisdiction 
under the ATS? 
  
 8. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (alteration in original). 
 9. Id. at 1665. 
 10. Id. at 1669. 
 11. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 12. Id. at 1671–72. 
 13. Id. at 1671. 
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The defendants are two foreign corporations. Their shares, like those 
of many foreign corporations, are traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change. Their only presence in the United States consists of an office 
in New York City (actually owned by a separate but affiliated com-
pany) that helps to explain their business to potential investors. . . . 
Under these circumstances, even if the New York office were a 
sufficient basis for asserting general jurisdiction, it would be 
farfetched to believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal and 
indirect American presence, that this legal action helps to vindicate a 
distinct American interest, such as in not providing a safe harbor for 
an “enemy of all mankind.”
14
 
So, while Breyer defends “a distinct American interest” in “not providing 
a safe harbor for an ‘enemy of all mankind,’” he agrees with the majority 
that “here it would ‘reach too far to say’ that such ‘mere corporate pres-
ence suffices’” and his measurement of defendants’ corporate presence 
in the U.S. relies primarily on their NYC office.
15
 He mentions—but 
does not seem to give much, if any, weight to—their listings on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), seemingly because such listings by for-
eign corporations are so common. 
HARBORING PIRATES ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE? 
None of the Kiobel opinions offers an explanation as to why de-
fendant corporations’ listings on the NYSE do not provide—or at least 
contribute significantly to the measurement of—sufficient ties to the U.S. 
This failure to attribute any significance to a foreign corporation’s listing 
on a U.S. exchange is striking because the majority relies heavily for its 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality on Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., in which the Court applied this presump-
tion to hold that Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs regarding 
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.
16
 
The complaint in Morrison was dismissed because it “involve[d] no se-
curities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases 
complained of by those petitioners who still have live claims occurred 
outside the United States.”
17
 The Morrison Court concludes that “Section 
10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on 
an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other secu-
rity in the United States.”
18
 Of course, nothing in Morrison suggests that 
foreign corporations trading securities on U.S. exchanges should be pro-
  
 14. Id. at 1678 (internal citation omitted). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 2888. 
 18. Id.  
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tected from liability. Indeed, there is no question that the Kiobel defend-
ants would face potential liability, both civil and criminal, for any viola-
tions of the reporting and other requirements of U.S. securities laws on 
the basis of their listings on the NYSE.  
Foreign corporations listing on the NYSE must comply with Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirements and open 
themselves up to the treble damages that the SEC can seek for insider 
trading violations, as well as civil penalties imposed by the SEC in ad-
ministrative proceedings. They also face potential private securities liti-
gation in the U.S. These reporting requirements and potential litigation 
threats require foreign corporations listing on U.S. exchanges to hire 
teams of U.S-trained attorneys to advise on and prepare their filings with 
a careful eye to reducing potential U.S. domestic legal liability, in partic-
ular the expense and potential liability related to securities class action 
lawsuits, and the potential individual civil and criminal liability of corpo-
rate officers, which can include prison terms.
19
 Also, any company re-
quired to file reports under the Exchange Act, as is any foreign corpora-
tion listed on the NYSE, is potentially liable under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) for bribing foreign government officials, and De-
partment of Justice and SEC investigations and enforcement proceedings 




The Court’s opinions in Kiobel provide no indication of why listing 
on the NYSE should bring with it this intense level of regulation and 
potential liability in U.S. courts in these other contexts and yet not be 
given greater weight in the determination of a corporation’s ties to the 
U.S. in regards to ATS jurisdiction. One justification for the distinction 
could be that the risks and requirements imposed on foreign corporations 
listing on U.S. exchanges by U.S. securities laws are directly related to 
their participation in the U.S. securities market in a way that ATS claims 
are not. However, the FCPA requirements attached to listing on the 
NYSE suggest that other U.S. priorities in regulating foreign business 
practices beyond simply protecting the domestic securities market can be 
pursued through placing conditions on access to U.S. exchanges. The 
type of corporate “piracy” alleged in Kiobel—the aiding and abetting of 
foreign government forces in horrific deeds for corporate gain—would 
seem to present precisely the kind of corporate misbehavior that foreign 
corporations could rightfully be required to face liability for in the U.S. 
in order to list on a U.S. exchange. Why shouldn’t their presence in the 
  
 19. For a sense of the magnitude of these risks and requirements, see, e.g., U.S. Securities and 




 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998).  
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U.S. securities market allow them to be “found” in the U.S. for the pur-
poses of ATS litigation, or at least be measured more significantly as ties 
to the U.S. that might constitute more than “mere corporate presence”? 
 
